Abstract-Provenance has become an important concept for services computing in general, and for scientific workflows in particular. Provenance often contains confidential data and dependencies whose access needs to be protected. Provenance access control policies control who can access which provenance information. Correct specification of provenance access control policies is critical to ensure system security. However, due to the sheer size of provenance, it is often difficult to comprehend the full effects of an access control policy by manual inspection alone due to complex multi-step dependencies and their interactions. In this paper, we present automated analysis algorithms and complexity results for three provenance analysis problems. We have also developed incremental strategies for these algorithms for evolving provenance and access control policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Provenance, which captures the derivation history of a data product, has become an important concept for services computing [1] , [2] , [3] in general, and for scientific workflows [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] in particular. Provenance is essential for scientific workflows to support reproducibility of scientific discovery, result interpretation, and problem diagnosis [8] , [9] . However, provenance collected from scientific workflows may contain confidential information. Due to the highly competitive nature of scientific research, it is important to ensure that sensitive provenance information can be accessed by and propagated to only authorized parties before the scientific results are ready for public release.
Access control is a security mechanism that restricts access to system resources to only authorized users. Existing access control mechanisms for business and scientific workflows (e.g. [10] , [11] , [12] ) support secure execution of workflow tasks, but not secure access of their dependencies. Dependencies are confidential data in projects in which the protection of the derivation history of a scientific result is critical.
While we have previously developed a role-based access control mechanisms for scientific workflow provenance [5] , how to ensure the correctness and understand the full effects of a provenance access control policy is still an open problem. This is challenging since in large scientific workflows, the size of the access control policies could also be large and it is often difficult to comprehend the full effects of a provenance access control policy by manual inspection alone due to complex multi-step dependencies and their interactions. In this paper, we present automated algorithms for analyzing provenance access control policies, which help administrators detect potential flaws in the policies. We define and solve three analysis problems: (1) the provenance access control policy existence problem, which checks whether there exists an access control policy that conforms to desirable dependency constraints; (2) the dependency satisfiability problem, which checks whether a given provenance access control policy conforms to desirable dependency constraints; and (3) the provenance completion problem, which checks whether a set of users together will be able to access all the dependencies in the provenance.
Our contributions are summarized below.
• We have developed algorithms for solving the above three analysis problems. • We have shown that the three analysis problems are NP-complete and developed polynomial algorithms for solving special cases of these problems. • We have developed incremental analysis algorithms for evolving provenance and access control policies. These algorithms incrementally update the analysis results by reusing the information obtained from the previous analysis, and hence are expected to be faster than the original algorithms. Figure 1 shows a scientific workflow w, which models the scientific process of performing intragenomic gene conversion analysis in bacterial genomes. Each workflow task represents a computational or analytical step of a scientific process. This workflow takes as input the protein sequences of a given genome and identifies all its multi-gene families (task t 1 ). A particular multi-gene family is then selected by the user and its associated DNA sequences are retrieved (task t 2 ). Next, a recombination analysis is performed on the retrieved sequences (task t 3 ), which consists of two steps: a multiple DNA sequence alignment step (task t 4 ) and a gene conversion detection step (task t 5 ); the latter is implemented by the off-the-shelf program GENECONV (task t 7 an input data file preparation step (task t 6 ). Each task in this workflow has input ports (i 1 − i 6 ) and output ports (o 1 − o 3 ) that provide the communication interface to other tasks. Tasks are linked together via data channels. There are 8 parameters p 1 − p 8 in this workflow, which are used to configure its dynamic execution behavior. This workflow can be executed many times for different genomes or for the same genome using different parameter settings; Every execution produces a workflow run provenance. Figure 2 gives a sample workflow run provenance of w, which is represented in a notation similar to the one used in the Open Provenance Model (OPM) [13] . Circles represent parameter values and data products, rectangles represent task runs that are labeled with task run identifier r k and task identifier t i , octagons represent users performing the tasks, and edges represent dependency relationships. Edge d i (p i ) ←− r 1 : t j represents the Used dependency, which specifies that data product d i (p i ) is the input to task t j in workflow run r 1 and edge r 1 : t j ←− d i represents the WasGeneratedBy dependency, which specifies that data product d i is the output of task t j in workflow run r 1 . Edge u W asControlledBy ←− r 1 : t j specifies that task t j was executed by user u in workflow run r 1 .
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Scientific Workflow Provenance
B. Role Based Access Control
Role based access control [14] has been widely used for restricting access to resources. In role based access control, users are assigned to roles and roles are assigned to permissions. Formally, an RBAC policy is defined as a tuple (U, R, P, U A, P A) where
• U , R, and P are finite sets of users, roles, and permissions, respectively.
• UA ⊆ U × R is a set of user-role assignments. (u, r) ∈ UA specifies that user u is a member of role r. For example, (alice, student) ∈ UA specifies that alice is a member of the student role.
• P A ⊆ R × P is the permission-role relation. (r, p) ∈ P A specifies that role r has granted permission to access p. For example, (student, dp) ∈ P A specifies that every member of the student role has permission to access dependency dp.
This paper is based on the role based access control for scientific workflow provenance proposed in [5] that controls which role can access which provenance component.
III. DEPENDENCY ANALYSIS
Correct understanding of a provenance access control policy and its associated dependency constraints is critical for assuring provenance security. However, due to the sheer size of provenance, it is often hard to comprehend the full effects of a provenance access control policy by simple manual inspection alone. Dependency analysis help administrators understand a policy and its associated dependency constraints better. In this section, we consider two types of dependency analysis problems: (1) provenance access control policy existence analysis, which checks whether there exists an RBAC policy that satisfies a dependency constraint; and (2) dependency satisfiability analysis, which checks whether a given RBAC policy satisfies a dependency constraint. Below, we first define dependency and dependency constraint.
Definition 1 (Dependency): We say that a data product d 2 is derived from a data product d 1 in provenance P in one step (one-step dependency), denoted as
Definition 2 (Provenance Dependency Graph): A provenance dependency graph G P for provenance P is a directed acyclic graph < V, E >, where each node in V represents a data product in P and each edge in E represents a one-step dependency. A role provenance dependency graph
, which specifies that role r must be allowed to access dependency
, which specifies that role r must not be allowed to access dependency
Definition 4 (Dependency Satisfiability):
We say that an RBAC policy satisfies dependency constraint
in one or more steps. We say that an RBAC policy satisfies dependency constraint disallow(r, d 1 
In this paper, we consider RBAC with cardinality constraint of the form cardinality(r, dset, k) (n > k), which specifies that a user who is a member of role r can access at most k one-step dependencies in set dset. This means that, if a user of role r has accessed k dependencies in dset, then the user cannot access the rest of dependencies in dset. This constraint prevents a user who is a member of role r from accessing more than k dependencies in dset even if the user Figure 2 . A sample provenance generated from the workflow in Figure 1 .
is also a member of another role that does not have such a constraint.
A. Provenance Access Control Policy Existence Analysis
The provenance access control policy existence analysis (PE) asks, given provenance P and a dependency constraint C, does there exist an RBAC policy for P that satisfies C? If there does not exist an RBAC policy that satisfies C, then adding cardinality constraints to the policy will not help the policy satisfy C. As a result, we need to consider only RBAC without the cardinality constraint for PE.
Solving PE is non-trivial, because allow/disallow constraints may interact with each other in unintended ways and trying to satisfy one allow/disallow constraint may result in the violation of another constraint. As an example, consider dependences between data products d 1 , . . . , d 5 shown in Figure 3 and the dependency constraint that is the conjunction of the following allow/disallow constraints: (3) cannot be satisfied. However, if we do not allow r to access d 5 → d 2 at the first place, all constraints can be satisfied. Clearly, it is inefficient to try all combinations of dependencies that should not be granted to r in order to satisfy the constraint.
Below, we show that PE for RBAC without cardinality constraint is NP-complete. First, we prove that the satisfiability problem for a 3-CNF formula, where each clause contains either all positive or negative literals, is NP-complete; we call such a formula 3-CNF-SAME formula.
Lemma 1: The satisfiability problem for a 3-CNF-SAME formula is NP-complete. Proof: Given a 3-CNF-SAME formula F and an assignment A, we can check whether A satisfies F in polynomial time. Thus the problem is in NP.
Next, we show that the problem is NP-hard by providing a polynomial-time reduction from the 3-CNF satisfiability problem to the problem. Let F = F 1 ∧ . . . ∧ F n be a 3-CNF formula. First, we replace every negative literall i in F with l i and append (l i ∨l i ∨false)∧(l i ∨l i ∨true) to the formula. After the reduction, every clause contains either all positive literals or all negative literals. The worst-case complexity of the reduction is O(|F |).
Let F be the transformed formula. Below, we show that F is satisfiable iff F is satisfiable. First, we prove "only if". Assume that F is true under a set of assignments
we add (l i , false) and (l i , true) to A . It is easy to see that F is true under A . Next, we prove "if". Assume that F is true under a set of assignments A . Then from the reduction, F is true under A . Thus the problem is NP-hard. 2 Theorem 2: PE for RBAC that does not contain the cardinality constraint is NP-Complete.
Proof: When the RBAC policy ψ does not contain the cardinality constraint, it takes polynomial time to check whether the policy satisfies the dependency constraint. Therefore, the problem is in NP.
Next, we show that PE is NP-hard by reducing the satisfiability problem for 3-CNF-SAME formula, to this problem. Let F = F 1 ∧ F 2 ∧ . . . ∧ F n be a 3-CNF-SAME formula. For every literal l in F , we create two nodes sn(l) and dn(l), and add edge sn(l) → dn(l) to G P . We then construct the dependency constraint
The corresponding PE problem pe is: does there exist an RBAC policy for P that satisfies C.
Finally, we show that F is satisfiable iff pe has a solution.
Proof for "only if": Assume that F is true under as-
This means that all l ij are false and hence F i is false. Thus F is not true under A, which is a contradiction. The case where C i contains disallow can be proven similarly.
Proof for "if": Assume that ψ satisfies C. l i is assigned true if (r, sn(l i ) → dn(l i )) ∈ P A; otherwise, l i is assigned false. We now show that F is true under the above assignments. Suppose that this is not the case, then there exists an F i that is false under the above assignments. If
, then all l ij s are false. This means that r does not have permission to access all sn(l ij ) → dn(l ij ) and hence C i is false. Thus C is not satisfied, which is a contradiction. The case where F i contains only negative literals can be proven similarly.
As an example, consider
The corresponding RBAC policy that satisfies the above constraint is (r, sn(
2 Below, we present an algorithm for solving PE. The algorithm reduces PE to the satisfiability problem of propositional formulas; PE has a solution iff the corresponding formula is satisfiable. The pseudocode of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. Function comp paths(r, d 1 , d 2 ) computes a set of all paths from d 1 to d 2 in G P (r) and lit(r, e) returns the literal corresponding to edge e in G P (r).
Below, we use the example in Figure 3 to illustrate our algorithm. 
Let |Od| be the maximum outgoing degree of nodes in G P and |Depth| be the maximum depth of G P . The maximum number of paths in G P is |Od| |Depth| . Thus, the worst-case complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(|C|(|Od| |Depth| ). We have also identified the following cases under which PE can be solved in polynomial time. Due to space constraints, the proofs are not given in the paper. for all p ∈ path set do 6:
for all e ∈ p do 8: only allow or disallow can be solved in polynomial time.
Theorem 4: PE for dependency constraint that does not contain ∧ can be solved in polynomial time.
B. Dependency Satisfiability Analysis
Dependency satisfiability analysis (DS) asks, given provenance P , an RBAC policy ψ for P , and a dependency constraint C, does ψ satisfy C? If ψ does not contain the cardinality constraint, DS can be easily solved by reducing it to the reachability analysis problem of dependency graphs for roles in C. The worst-case time complexity of the algorithm is O(|C||G P |).
With cardinality constraints, the problem becomes NPcomplete, as shown below.
Theorem 5: DS is NP-Complete. Proof: Given a set of role-dependency assignments Rd that conforms to RBAC policy ψ, it takes polynomial time to check if Rd satisfies the dependency constraint C. Therefore, the problem is in NP.
Next, we show that DS is NP-hard by providing a polynomial time reduction from the satisfiability problem of 3-CNF-SAME to the problem. Without loss of generality, we assume that three literals in the same clause are pairwise different. Let F = F 1 ∧ . . . ∧ F n be a 3-CNF-SAME formula where
For every clause F i that contains all positive literals, we append allow(r, S → * T i ) to dependency constraint C as a conjunct, and for every l ij in F i , we add (r, S → node(l ij )) ∈ P A and (r, node(l ij ) → T i ) ∈ P A to ψ. For every clause F i that contains all negative literals, we add cardinality(r, {S → node(l i1 ), S → node(l i2 ), S → node(l i3 )}, 2) to ψ. The corresponding DS problem ds is: does policy ψ satisfy the dependency constraint C? The worst-case complexity of the reduction is O(|F |).
Finally, we show that F is satisfiable iff ds has a solution.
Proof for "only if": Assume that F is true under assignments { (l 1 , v 1 ) , . . . , (l m , v m )}. For every F i containing all positive literals, if l ij is true, then (r, S → node(l ij )) ∈ P A and (r, node(l ij ) → T i ) ∈ P A satisfy allow(r, S → * T i ). For every clause F i that contains all negative literals, at least one of l ij is false. Correspondingly, r does not have permission to access one of the following dependencies: S → node(l i1 ), S → node(l i2 ), and S → node(l i3 ). Therefore, the cardinality constraint is satisfied. Thus ds has a solution.
Proof for "if": If ds has a solution, then ψ satisfies the dependency constraint C. This means that, for every F i that contains only positive literals, r can access at least one of the dependencies S → node(l i1 ), S → node(l i2 ), and S → node(l i3 ). In this case, the corresponding literal in F i is assigned true and hence F i is true. Since all cardinality constraints are satisfied, for every F i containing only negative literals, r cannot access at least one of the dependencies S → node(l i1 ), S → node(l i2 ), and S → node(l l3 ). In this case, the corresponding literal is assigned false and hence F i is true. Note that a literal cannot be assigned both true and false. Otherwise, assume that l ij is assigned both true and false. Then S → node(l ij ) is both accessible and not accessible by r, which is a contradiction. Therefore, F is true and hence DS is NP-hard.
As an example, consider the 3-CNF-SAME formula 2 ∨l 3 ) . First, we process the first clause, add allow(r, S → * T 1 ) to C, and add (r, S → node(l 1j )) ∈ P A and (r, node(l 1j ) → T 1 ) ∈ P A for 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 to ψ. We then process the second clause and add cardinality(r, {S → node(l 11 ), S → node(l 12 ), S → node(l 13 )}, 2) to ψ. F is true under assignments {(l 1 , true), (l 2 , true), (l 3 , false)}. Correspondingly, ψ grants role r permission to access dependencies where |Od| is the maximum outgoing degree of nodes in G P and |Depth| is the maximum depth of G P .
As an example, consider the dependency graph in Figure 3, dependency constraint (allow(r, d 1 
, and cardinality constraint cardinality(r, {d 1 
Assume that (r, d) ∈ P A for every dependency d in the graph. The following combinations of paths satisfy the dependency constraint: (a) {d 1 
but only (b) and (c) satisfy the cardinality constraint. Therefore the algorithm returns true.
IV. PROVENANCE COMPLETION PROBLEM
Provenance completion problem (PC) asks, given an RBAC policy ψ and provenance metadata P , does there exist a set of users U ⊆ U that together can access all dependencies D = {dp 1 , · · · , dp m } in P under ψ? The problem is true iff there exists a set of user-dependency assignments {(u 1 , dp 1 ), . . . , (u n , dp m )} such that u i ∈ U and the assignments conforms to ψ.
A naive algorithm for solving the problem is given below, which is a brute-force approach that consists of two phases. In the first phase, for every dependency dp ∈ D, if there exists a user u ∈ U such that (u, r) ∈ UA and (r, dp) ∈ P A, and there does not exist cardinality(r, dset, k) ∈ ψ where dp ∈ dset, then the algorithm assigns u to dp. Otherwise, dp is added to a working set S. In the second phase, we try all possible combinations of assignments of users in U to S to search for a solution in which each dependency in S is assigned to some user in U and no cardinality constraint is violated. The procedure terminates when such a solution is found or all combinations are exhausted. The worst-case time complexity of the algorithm is O(|U | |S| ). Theorem 6: PC is NP-complete. Proof: Given a set of user-dependency assignments A ⊆ U × D, we can verify whether every dependency in D has been assigned to a user in U and if the assignment conforms to the RBAC policy in polynomial time. Therefore, the problem is in NP.
Next, we show that PC is NP-hard by providing a polynomial time reduction from the 3-CNF satisfiability problem to the problem. Let F = F 1 ∧ F 2 ∧ . . . ∧ F n be a 3-CNF formula. The reduction is given below. Each clause F j is mapped to a dependency dp j . Each literal l i is mapped to a user-role assignment (u i , r i ) ∈ UA. If l i appears (either positively or negatively) in F j , (r i , dp j ) ∈ P A is added to ψ. If l i appears positively in F j1 and negatively in F j2 , a cardinality constraint cardinality(r i , {dp j1 , dp j2 }, 1) is added to ψ. Let k be the number of literals in F . The corresponding provenance completion problem pc is: does there exist a set of users U ⊆ {u 1 , . . . , u k } that together can access all dependencies {dp 1 , . . . , dp n } under the RBAC policy ψ.
Below, we show that F is satisfiable iff pc has a solution.
Proof for "only if": Assume that F is true under the set of assignments {(l 1 , v 1 ), . . . , (l k , v k ) }. If v i = true, l i appears positively in F j , and dp j has not been assigned to any user, then assign dp j to u i . if v i = false, l i appears negatively in F j , and dp j has not been assigned to any user, then assign dp j to u i . Since F is true, all F i s are true and hence all dp i s are assigned to some user. Next, we prove that the above assignment does not violate the cardinality constraint. Assume that cardinality(r, {dp j1 , dp j2 }, 1) is violated. Then there exists u ∈ U such that (u, r) ∈ UA and u is assigned to both dp j1 and dp j2 . From the reduction, one of the following holds: (1) l i appears positively in F j1 and negatively in F j2 ; or (2) l i appears negatively in F j1 and positively in F j2 . In both cases, l i is assigned both values true and false, which is a contradiction. Therefore, pc has a solution.
Proof for "if": Assume that pc has a solution {(u 1 , dp 1 ), . . . , (u m , dp n )}. We iterate from dp 1 to dp n and apply one of the following rules to compute a set of assignments under which F is true: (1) If u i is assigned dp j , l i appears positively in F j , and l i has not been assigned any value, then l i is assigned true. (2) If u i is assigned dp j , p i appears negatively in F j , and l i has not been assigned any value, then l i is assigned false. Since every dependency is assigned to some user, the above rules guarantee that all F i s are true. The cardinality constraint ensures that no literals can be assigned to both true and false. Therefore F is true under the above assignments.
As an example, consider the 3-CNF formula
The following RBAC policy is generated: (u 1 , r 1 ) ∈ UA, (u 2 , r 2 ) ∈ UA, (u 3 , r 3 ) ∈ UA, (u 4 , r 4 ) ∈ UA, (u 5 , r 5 ) ∈ UA (r 1 , dp 1 ) ∈ P A, (r 2 , dp 1 ) ∈ P A, (r 3 , dp 1 ) ∈ P A, (r 2 , dp 2 ) ∈ P A, (r 3 , dp 2 ) ∈ P A, (r 4 , dp 2 ) ∈ P A, (r 2 , dp 3 ) ∈ P A, (r 3 , dp 3 ) ∈ P A, (r 5 , dp 3 ) ∈ P A, cardinality(r 2 , {dp 1 , dp 2 }, 1), cardinality(r 2 , {dp 1 , dp 3 }, 1). The corresponding PC is: does there exist a set of users U ⊆ {u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , u 4 , u 5 } that together can access all dependencies {dp 1 , dp 2 , dp 3 } under the RBAC policy ψ? The formula is satisfied under assignment {(l 2 , false), (l 3 , true), (l 5 , true)}. The solution for the corresponding PC is {(u 2 , dp 1 ), (u 3 , dp 2 ), (u 5 , dp 3 )}.
Below, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for solving the following two special cases: (1) each user is constrained at most once, i.e., for every user u ∈ U , there do not exist cardinality(r 1 , dset 1 , k 1 ) ∈ ψ and cardinality(r 2 , dset 2 , k 2 ) ∈ ψ, such that (u, r 1 ) ∈ UA and (u, r 2 ) ∈ UA; or (2) if a user u ∈ U is a member of roles in the set of constraints cardinality(r 1 , dset 1 , k 1 ) , . . . , cardinality(r n , dset 2 , k n ),
Let Con be a set of all cardinality constraints in ψ. The algorithm is given below. First, we perform the first stage of the naive algorithm. Next, for every cardinality(r, dset, k) ∈ Con, if the constraint satisfies |{s | s ∈ S ∧ s ∈ dset}| ≤ k, we assign a user who is a member of role r to all dependencies in dset, remove such dependencies from S, and remove the constraint from Con. We then construct a bipartite graph G from U and S as follows. Each vertice in G corresponds to one dependency in S or one user in U that is a member of a role in the cardinality constraint in Con. Let V u represent the vertice corresponding to user u and V dp represent the vertice corresponding to dependency dp. For every cardinality(r, pdet, k) ∈ Con and every u who is a member of role r, we duplicate V u k − 1 times, which results in nodes V to all vertices corresponding to dependencies in dset that can be accessed by r. Finally, we apply the maximum bipartite matching algorithm to compute the maximum matching between vertices representing users and vertices representing dependencies. The problem is true if the size of the maximum matching is equal to |S|, which means that all dependencies in S can be assigned to some users in U . The number of times a user vertice is duplicated ensures that the maximum matching also does not violate the cardinality constraint. Note that this algorithm can also be applied to the case where all constraints in Con updated after the first stage satisfy one of the two conditions.
The worst-case complexity for the first stage is O(|Con||U ||R||D|). The worst-case complexity of maximum matching algorithm for a graph G =< V,E > is O(|V | (1/2) |E|). In our algorithm, the maximum number of vertices and edges are |U ||S| + |S| and |U ||S| 2 , respectively. Therefore the worst-case complexity of the above algorithm is O((|Con||U ||R||D| + (|U ||S| + |S|)
(1/2) (|U ||S| 2 )). As an example, consider the following RBAC policy: 5 ) ∈ UA (r 1 , dp 1 ) ∈ P A, (r 1 , dp 2 ) ∈ P A, (r 1 , dp 3 ) ∈ P A, (r 2 , dp 3 ) ∈ P A, (r 2 , dp 4 ) ∈ P A, (r 3 , dp 4 ) ∈ P A, (r 3 , dp 5 ) ∈ P A (r 3 , dp 6 ) ∈ P A, (r 4 , dp 7 ) ∈ P A, (r 4 , dp 8 ) ∈ P A, (r 4 , dp 9 ) ∈ P A, (r 5 , dp 9 ) ∈ P A, (r 5 , dp 10 ) ∈ P A, cardinality(r 1 , {dp 1 , dp 2 , dp 3 }, 2), cardinality(r 3 , {dp 4 , dp 5 , dp 6 }, 2), cardinality(r 4 , {dp 7 , dp 8 , dp 9 }, 2). cardinality(r 5 , {dp 9 , dp 10 }, 1).
Our algorithm works as follows. First, u 2 is assigned to dp 3 and dp 4 , because u 2 is not a member of roles in any cardinality constraint. Other dependencies are added to S. We then remove dp 3 from cardinality(r 1 , {dp 1 , dp 2 , dp 3 }, 2) and remove dp 4 from cardinality(r 3 , {dp 4 , dp 5 , dp 6 }, 2). As a result, the number of dependencies in these Example: algorithm for two special cases of PC two constraints is 2 and hence these two constraints are satisfied.
We then assign u 1 to dp 1 and dp 2 , assign u 3 to dp 5 and dp 6 , remove these dependencies from S, and remove the two constraints from Con.
Next, we process cardinality(r 4 , {dp 7 , dp 8 , dp 9 }, 2) and cardinality(r 5 , {dp 9 , dp 10 }, 1), and construct a bipartite graph as shown in . We then add edges from these vertices to V dp7 , V dp8 and V dp9 . Since u 5 is a member of r 5 , we add edges from V u5 to V dp9 and V dp10 . Finally, the maximum matching algorithm is applied to compute a solution for the problem. In Figure 4 , edges are represented using dotted/solid lines, and edges represented using solid lines are the maximum matching computed. The algorithm returns true as the size of maximum matching is equal to |S|. The solution is {(u 1 , dp 1 ), (u 1 , dp 2 ), (u 2 , dp 3 ), (u 2 , dp 4 ), (u 3 , dp 5 ), (u 3 , dp 6 ), (u 3 , dp 7 ), (u 4 , dp 8 ), (u 4 , dp 9 ), (u 5 , dp 10 )}.
V. INCREMENTAL ANALYSIS ALGORITHMS
The provenance access control policy and dependency constraints may evolve over time in order to fix flaws and cope with changing requirements of organizations. Changes to the policy or the provenance may invalidate the analysis result. It would be inefficient to perform reanalysis from scratch every time a change occurs. To address this issue, we present efficient algorithms that reuse the previous analysis result to incrementally perform reanalysis. Due to space constraints, we present only algorithms for the provenance completion problem (PC) and consider only operations for adding user-role relation, permission role relation, and the cardinality constraint. Other operations and incremental algorithms for DS and PE can be handled similarly.
To enable incremental analysis, we store the set of userdependency assignments A 1 and the workset S computed in the first phase. If the previous result is true, we also store the set of user-dependency assignments A 2 computed in the second phase.
Add cardinality(r, dset, k) to ψ:: If (u, r) ∈ UA for all u ∈ U , the algorithm simply returns the previous result. If the previous result is false, then adding cardinality(r, dset, k) does not change the result, but may invalidate some assignments in A 1 . Our algorithm updates A 1 as follows: for every dp ∈ dset, if (u, dp) ∈ A 1 and (u, r) ∈ UA, then the algorithm tries to find another user u ∈ U such that (u , r ) ∈ UA and (r , dp) ∈ P A, and there does not exist cardinality(r , dset , k) ∈ ψ where dp ∈ dset . If such a user exists, the algorithm replaces (u, dp) with (u , dp). In other cases, the algorithm removes (u, dp) from A 1 and adds dp to the workset S. If the previous result is true, then adding cardinality(r, dset, k) may change the result. In this case, the algorithm updates A 1 and S as given above, and performs the second phase using the updated A 1 and S.
Add (r, dp) ∈ P A: If (1) (u, r) ∈ UA for all u ∈ U or (2) the previous result is true, then adding (r, dp) ∈ P A does not change the result. In case (2), the assignments in A 1 may change. The algorithm updates A 1 as follows: if dp ∈ S, there exists a user u ∈ U such that (u, r) ∈ UA, and there does not exist cardinality(r, dset, k) ∈ ψ where dp ∈ dset, then the algorithm adds (u, dp) to A 1 , removes dp from S, and removes the assignment for dp from A 2 . If the previous result is false, the algorithm updates A 1 and S as given above, and performs the second phase.
Add (u, r) ∈ UA: If (1) u = u for all u ∈ U or (2) the previous result is true, then adding (u, r) ∈ UA does not change the result. In case (2), if there does not exist (u , r) ∈ UA such that u ∈ U , then the algorithm updates A 1 as follows. For every dp ∈ S, if (r, dp) ∈ P A and there does not exist cardinality(r, dset, k) ∈ ψ where dp ∈ dset, then the algorithm adds (u, dp) to A 1 , removes dp from S, and performs the second phase. If the previous result is false, then adding (u, r) may change the result. In this case, the algorithm updates A 1 as given above and performs the second phase.
polynomial time algorithms for correcting unsound views to meet two local optimality conditions. However, to the best of our knowledge, PE and DS have not been considered by other researchers.
Provenance completion problem:: When the cardinality constraint is not considered, the provenance completion problem can be solved using algorithms for workflow satisfiability analysis [26] , [27] , [28] . However, none of them considered the cardinality constraint defined in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented algorithms and complexity results for three provenance analysis problems and developed incremental algorithms for analyzing evolving provenance and RBAC policies.
In the future, we will explore the possibility of developing fixed-parameter tractable algorithms for solving these problems, i.e., algorithms that are exponential in the size of small factors but are polynomial in the size of large factors. In addition, we will consider several subclasses of problem instances by imposing structural restrictions on dependency constraints. For example, when the dependency constraints do not contain ∨, it is not clear if PE is still NP-complete.
